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Why the Joint Powers Authority
Refunding Bond Model Works:
A Critique of the Attorney General's

Claim of Unconstitutionality
by JOSEPH L. J. APPEL*

Introduction
In 2007, amid concerns that cash-out refunding bonds were
legally unsound and might violate state law,' State Senator Joseph
Simitian (D-Palo Alto)-a former local school board membersubmitted five questions to the California Attorney General
addressing the legality of cash-out refunding bonds.2 Of particular
interest is Question 5, which asks whether a school district may sell
refunding bonds to a joint powers authority ("JPA")3 with an above* Juris Doctor Candidate 2010, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law; Bachelor of Arts 2003, University of California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank
Professor Darien Shankse for his guidance throughout the drafting process; John
Hartenstein for his time and valuable insights; and the members of the Quarterly'sVolume
37 team for their hard work and dedication. Lastly, I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude
to my family for all their support over the past three years.
1. See e.g., Bob Porterfield, Schools use controversialpracticefor extra cash (cash-out
refunding), FreeRepublic.com, Apr. 4, 2006, available at http://www.freerepublic.coml
focus/f-news/1623869/posts; Neil Gonzalez, Report: school-bond refinancing costing
taxpayers more, BNET, July 12, 2008, available at http://find articles.com/p/articles/
mi.qn4l761is_20080712/ain28063389/?tag=content;coll;
Citizens for School Bond
Accountability Blog, http://citizensforschoolbondaccountability.blogspot.com/ (last visited
Jan. 16,2010).
2. Rich Saskal, Cashing-Out in California,The Bond Buyer, Apr. 26, 2007, available
at http://www.bond buyer.com/news/-269320-1.html.
3. A joint powers authority is a separate legal entity that is created when "two or
more public agencies by agreement . . . jointly exercise any power common to the
contracting parties." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6502. An example of a JPA would be the
Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Authority, which was formed by the City of Oakland
and Alameda County in 1995 to finance renovations to the Oakland-Alameda County
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market interest rate.4 The Attorney General answered No, stating
that because such an arrangement results in an issuance of refunding
bonds in excess of the minimum amount required to refund the
school district's outstanding indebtedness, it would violate the state's
constitutional voter approval requirement for incurring new
indebtedness and levying new taxes.'
This Comment is a critique of the Attorney General's answer to
Question 5, and as such, it is assumed that the reader has already read
the opinion.6 Moreover, to avoid redundancy and to save the readers'
time, this Comment relies largely on the foundation provided by the
Attorney General's opinion that explains the basic mechanics of
municipal bonds, and refunding bonds in particular Part I provides
the relevant constitutional provisions, attempts to explain how
refunding bonds work by giving several examples, and offers a brief
synopsis of the Attorney General's opinion. Part II lays out a critique
of the Attorney General's opinion that focuses on, inter alia, a
problematic assumption, dicta cited as precedent, and a substanceover-form argument that does not conform with existing case law.
I.

Background

A. Relevant Constitutional Provisions
In California, a school district's ability to issue refunding bonds is
Article XIIIA,
restricted by a pair of constitutional provisions
section 1, prohibits a school district from levying ad valorem property
taxes in excess of one percent to support new debt, unless that debt
existed prior to July 1, 1978, or resulted from voter-approved bonds
satisfying article XVI, section 18.' Article XVI, section 18, requires
two-thirds or fifty-five percent (depending on the nature of the
project) voter approval before issuing new bonded indebtedness."
These two provisions thus work in tandem, requiring a school district

Coliseum and Oracle Arena and to manage both of these facilities.
http://www.coliseum.com/info/images/ DVC_ ColiseumAuth-sm 062005.pdf (last visited
Jan. 23, 2010).
4. 92 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 1 (2009).
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. Id. at 3-9.
8. There is also an applicable statutory scheme. See infra Part II.

9. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(a), (b)(2), (b)(3).
10. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18(a), (b).
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to obtain voter approval "for both pieces of the refunding bond
process-i.e., both to issue the bonds and to levy the taxes to repay
them."'" A JPA, by contrast, is not bound by either of these
constitutional provisions and thus can incur new debt without twothirds voter approval. 2
B. Cash-Out Refunding
Cash-out refunding operates much like refinancing a home
mortgage. A homeowner might refinance his existing mortgage (old
debt) at a lower interest rate and take out additional cash (new debt)
to pay for home improvements, education, travel, etc. In the cash-out
refunding context, a school district issues refunding bonds in an
amount sufficient to pay off its existing bonds (old debt) and to also
create excess proceeds (new debt) in the process. The excess
proceeds are analogous to the additional cash in the home mortgagerefinancing scenario and are used to shore up over-budget capital
projects and pay for other school-related expenditures.
The cash-out refunding bonds at issue here-that is, those bonds
issued in conjunction with a JPA-are slightly more complex.
Accordingly, a basic example of such an arrangement might go as
follows.
First, a school district and one or more additional
government units (e.g., a county) form a JPA. The school district
then sells the JPA $10 million in refunding bonds. These bonds are
sold with an interest rate that is pegged below the original interest
rate and above the current market rate. The JPA then sells $11
million in revenue bonds at the current market interest rate to
investors. Because the school district's refunding bonds were issued
with an above-market interest rate, the debt service on those bonds is
designed to cover the debt service on the JPA's revenue bonds. As a
result of these two transactions-the JPA purchasing $10 million in
refunding bonds and then selling $11 million in revenue bonds-the
JPA is left with $1 million to spend on local capital improvements,
including new school facilities.
In even more simple terms, imagine that the school district has a
loan with an original interest rate of six percent. It then has the
opportunity to refinance that loan at the current market rate of four
percent. Instead, however, it refinances at five percent. The one

11. 92 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. at 2.
12. See Rider v. City of San Diego, 18 Cal. 4th 1035 (1998).
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percent difference between the market rate and the refinanced rate
goes to the JPA, which then spends it on school-related projects.
C. The Opinion: A Synopsis
School districts recently began to use refunding bonds as a means
to create excess proceeds for unfinished or over-budget capital
projects. This controversial practice, dubbed "cash-out" refunding,
was criticized as violating state law because it generated a premium
without voter approval. 3 The controversy eventually escalated,
provoking voter backlash and, in some cases, sparking litigation. 4 In
2007, State Senator Simitian posed several questions to the State
Attorney General to bring clarity to the situation. One of these
questions hypothesized a refunding bond issued in conjunction with a
JPA. Specifically, the senator asked:
May a school district, acting without voter approval, sell
refunding general obligation bonds to a joint powers authority
at par value but with an above-market interest rate in exchange
for the joint powers authority's agreement to issue its own
revenue bonds and to use the resulting proceeds both to
purchase the school district's refunding bonds and to fund the
construction of additional school facilities? 5
The Attorney General answered in the negative, stating:
Because the proposed arrangement between a school district
and a joint powers authority would result in a refunding bond
issuance in excess of that needed to merely refund the district's
designated outstanding bonded indebtedness, both the
refunding bond issuance and the higher tax required to support
it are constitutionally impermissible without specific voter
approval6
The Attorney General continues by making a substance-overform argument by analogizing the JPA refunding bond model to a
non-JPA-based cash-out scheme in which the premium would be

13. See supra note 1.
14. See e.g., Jack Van Zandt, The San Jose Unified School District Bond Refinancing
Scheme, available at http://www.sanjoseinside.com/sji/blog/entries/the-san.jose-unified
-school_district-bond-refinancing-scheme/.
15. 92 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. at 2.
16. Id. at 20.
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spent directly by the school district." The opinion next acknowledges
that the refunding bonds would be sold without premium and
assumes that JPAs promise to finance capital projects for the school
district in exchange for above-market interest rates on the refunding
bonds."8 The Attorney General concludes his analysis on this point by
stating that the constitution's debt limit only allows refunding bonds
that are limited to refunding existing debt and refers the reader to
Question 1 for further analysis.' 9
In his response to Question 1, the Attorney General argues that
cash-out scenarios in which the principal amount owed by the district
is not increased are unconstitutional because "the excess proceeds
beyond those needed to merely refinance existing debt would result20
from an artificial increase in the refunding bonds' interest rate.,
This "artificial increase" is a reference to an above-market interest
rate. The Attorney General considers the proceeds from such an
interest rate to be new bonded indebtedness, therefore triggering the
two-thirds voter approval requirement.
The Attorney General also argues that the JPA model would be
unconstitutional because the above-market interest rates would result
in an increase in, or perpetuation of, ad valorem property taxes higher
than what is necessary to retire the original bonds. 2' The reader is
then referred to the analysis found in the answer to Question 3 to

17. Id.
18. Id. at 20-21.
19. Id. at 21. Here is the relevant excerpt from the answer to Question 1 referenced
in the answer to Question 5:
Accordingly, to the extent that a district's proposed refunding bonds would
generate proceeds beyond the amount needed to refund its outstanding bonds,
we believe that the refunding bonds would constitute a new bonded indebtedness
within the meaning of article XVI, section 18, and would therefore require
specific voter approval. Likewise, article XIII A, section 1, would prohibit the
levying of taxes to support such new debt without voter approval.
We acknowledge that some cash-out scenarios may not necessarily increase the
principal amount owed by the district beyond that of the existing debt. However,
this is a distinction without a constitutional difference. In such cash-out
scenarios, the excess proceeds beyond those needed to merely refinance existing
debt would result from an artificial increase in the refunding bonds' interest rate.
And the constitution's prohibitions apply to "bonded indebtedness"-a term that
includes both the principal and the interest associated with a bond sale. Hence,
the district's debt would nonetheless exceed what is necessary to retire the
original obligation, thereby triggering the voter-approval requirement.
Id. at 12-13.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 22.
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support this position.2
Question 3's response interprets article
XIIIA, section l's one-percent property tax cap as a prohibition
against increases or continuations of taxes at a rate higher than
necessary to refund existing debt.' 24
II. A Critique of the Attorney General's Opinion
A. Market Rate Is Not Mandatory

The Attorney General makes several claims in support of his
categorical rejection of cash-out refunding schemes, none more
important than the implicit argument that refunding bonds must be
sold at market rate. This assumption lies at the heart of the opinion
and provides the foundation for the Attorney General's principal
argument: "To the extent that a district's proposed refunding bonds
would generate proceeds beyond the amount needed to refund its
outstanding bonds, we believe that the refunding bonds would

constitute a new bonded indebtedness within the meaning of article

22. Here is the relevant excerpt from the answer to Question 3 referenced in the
answer to Question 5:
Article XIII A, section 1, imposes a one-percent property tax cap on local
agencies, with the exception that ad valorem taxes may be levied to pay principal
and interest on voter-approved bonds permitted under article XVI, section 18.
Thus, the constitution prohibits increases or continuations of taxes, without voter
approval, at a rate higher than necessary to refund the original voter-approved
bonds, and therefore would forbid the imposition or maintaining of an ad
valorem tax to support cash-out refunding bonds as proposed.
Id. at 18.
23. Id. The Attorney General does not cite any authority or provide any rationale for
his interpretation. Instead, the Attorney General makes a logical leap from the
constitutional tax cap to a ban on higher-than-necessary tax rates, leaving us to connect
the dots. Such underdeveloped reasoning is not persuasive, much less grounds for finding
the JPA refunding bond model unconstitutional. To the extent that the JPA model might
be viewed as an exception to the restrictive "spirit" of the constitutional tax limitation
imposed by article XIIIA and, therefore, should be interpreted narrowly, the Attorney
General's stance is not unreasonable. However, neither the answer to Question 3 nor the
answer to Question 5 advances this argument.
24. It should be noted that the referenced answers to Questions 1 and 3 address nonJPA-based cash-out refunding bond schemes rather than those refunding bond issuances
structured around a JPA that are at issue in Question 5. This apples-to-oranges approach
is all the more curious considering the distinct powers granted to, and limitations placed
upon, school districts and JPAs by the constitution and state law. See generally CAL.
CONST. art. XIIIA, art. XVI § 18; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6500 et seq.; CAL. EDUC. CODE §
15000-15425. Yet the opinion does not explore in depth the powers of the JPA or the
JPA-school district relationship. And while the Attorney General notes that he was not
asked to examine the powers of the JPA, it seems that such an analysis is required to fully
answer the question presented.
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XVI, section 18, and would therefore require specific voter approval."

This statement is predicated upon the assumption that a refunding
bond must be sold at market rate because if a bond is sold above

market rate (and everything else being equal), the bond proceeds will
be more than what is necessary to retire the original bonds, which
would (according to the Attorney General) create new indebtedness
and therefore trigger the two-thirds voter approval requirement.
There are, however, several flaws in the Attorney General's line of

reasoning.
Dicta, Dicta, Dicta
The Attorney General supports this market rate mandate with
Golden Gate Bridge and Highway District v. Filmer,25 which he cites
1.

for the proposition that a school district must sell its bonds on the
"best terms available." 6 The Attorney General's interpretation of
the Golden Gate court's decision is unique, however, as no other
California court has ever cited Golden Gate for this particular
proposition.27 And with good reason-this language is dicta. The
single question presented in Golden Gate was whether the term "rate
of interest" referred to the coupon rate or the interest yielded to

investors.28 The court held that it was the former.29 In coming to its
conclusion, however, the court discussed several decisions from other
states including Rowland v. Deck." In that case, the Kansas Supreme

Court held that bonds may be issued at a discount if they bear the

maximum interest named and are sold on the "best terms available."31

The Attorney General seizes upon this language and references 3it2
several times in the opinion to support his market rate argument.
Yet, this language is merely the summarized holding of an out-of-

state court that does not address the question presented in the case in
25. Golden Gate Bridge and Highway Dist. V. Filmer, 217 Cal. 754 (1933).
26. 92 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. at 7.
27. Only six California cases that have cited Golden Gate in the 77 years since it was
decided. Connerly v. State Personnel Bd., 92 Cal. App. 4th 16, 49 (2001); Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 126 Cal. App. 3d 814, 819 (1981); Assoc. Students of N. Peralta
Cmty. Coll. v. Bd. of Tr., 92 Cal. App. 3d 672, 677 (1979); Veterans of Foreign Wars v.
California, 36 Cal. App. 3d 688, 692 (1974); Eastern Mun. Water Dist. v. Scott, 1 Cal.App.3d
129, 135 (1969); Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal. v. Toll, 1 Cal.2d 421,430 (1934).
28. Golden Gate, 217 Cal. at 756-57.
29. Id. at 762.
30. Id. at 760.
31. Rowland v. Deck, 195 P. 868, 871 (Kan. 1921).
32. See, e.g., 92 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. at 7, 18 n.66.
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which it is cited. As such, it is highly doubtful that any court would
find such dicta to be persuasive, let alone controlling precedent.33
Moreover, Rowland was cited by the Golden Gate court for the

general rule that, in the absence of express statutory language to the
contrary, municipal bonds may be sold for less than par. The court in
Golden Gate, quoting the Kansas Supreme Court, stated that when

confronted with statutory silence on the issue of the amount for which
a bond may be sold, a "'strong presumption [is created] that the
legislature was content to rely upon the good faith and business
judgment of the local officials to see that the bonds brought
substantially the market price.""' By analogy, where, as here, there is

no statute on point regarding the interest rate at which a bond must
be sold, it is reasonable to assume that the state legislature most likely
intended to defer to the good faith and business judgment of the
school district board members to secure an interest rate. 35 Even then,
Golden Gate would only require that the refunding bonds bring
"substantially the market [rate]." 36
Even if the Attorney General's interpretation were accepted, the
phrase "best terms available" is ambiguous at best. And due to everchanging market conditions, defining the "best terms" would have to
be done on a case-by-case basis-a process that conflicts with the
Attorney General's categorical rejection of all refunding bonds issued
with above-market interest rates.

33. If anything, the Golden Gate court relied on legislative intent when it concluded
that "it was the intent of the lawmaking power to grant to the [directors] the entire
discretion to sell at the best advantage possible under the circumstances." Golden Gate,
217 Cal. at 760. And while citing legislative intent could be a legitimate rebuttal against
the JPA bond refunding model, the Attorney General only mentions legislative intent and
legislative history in passing. 92 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. at 16 n.58.
34. Golden Gate, 217 Cal. at 760 (quoting Rowland v.Deck, 195 P. at 871) (emphasis added).
35. In fact, the state legislature has already granted school districts discretion when
issuing bonds. See Gov'T CODE § 53555 ("Refunding bonds issued pursuant to this article
may be exchanged for the bonds to be refunded on such basis as the legislative body
determines is for the benefit of the local agency..."). There is, of course, an existing
political check on the school district's discretion: If voters believe that their interests are
not being faithfully represented, they can always vote the school district board members
out of office. This point dovetails somewhat with the school district's fiduciary duty as
managers of public funds. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53600 et seq. The Attorney General
only hints at this duty, see 92 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. at 18 n.66, even though it presents
another potentially legitimate attack on JPA-financed refunding bonds.
36. Golden Gate, 217 Cal. at 760 (quoting Rowland v. Deck, 195 P. at 871).
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Three More Problems

The market-rate premise presents three additional problems as
well. First, there is no provision in the state constitution and no
statute on the books that requires refunding bonds to be sold at the
current market rate.
Education Code section 15140 sets the
maximum interest rate at eight percent.37 Government Code section
15146(e) sets the ceiling for the interest rate at the legal maximum
(currently twelve percent).38 But nowhere is the interest rate on a
refunding bond mandated to be the market rate. In other words, a
school district is not legally compelled to sell their refunding bonds at
the current market interest rate. Thus, rather than interpret existing
statutes or constitutional provisions, the Attorney General purports
to create new law.
Second, statutes authorizing negotiated bond sales would be
problematic. Government Code section 6589 explicitly allows for
negotiated sales between local agencies and JPAs.39 Education Code
section 15146 specifically provides for negotiated sales or competitive
bidding.' Neither code section requires refunding bonds to be sold at
market rate, but rather they expressly permit more tailored
transactions, allowing a school district the flexibility to land the best
overall deal. Under the Attorney General's opinion, however, these
sections would be more difficult to apply.
Third, such an approach is too inflexible to account for the
volatility of the marketplace. The Attorney General assumes that
that the school district will know what the market rate will be when
the bonds are sold. But like any free trading marketplace, the bond
market's daily fluctuations are unpredictable. And to be able to react
to these changing market conditions and obtain the best overall deal,
the parties to the transaction must have the ability to adjust the
interest rate as well as other bond terms.
B.

Substance Over Form Fails

The Attorney
argument, asserting
as a cash-out with
closing (acquired in

37.
38.
39.

General also makes a substance-over-form
that "[q]ualitatively, the JPA scheme is the same
premium in which the excess cash received at
exchange for above-market interest rates) would

CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15140.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15146(e); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916-1.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6589.

40. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15146.
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be expended by the district on capital projects. 4 1 The California
Supreme Court addressed a similar qualitative argument in Rider v.
City of San Diego. In that case, a JPA had been formed as part of a
lease financing arrangement for the specific purpose of financing the
expansion of a convention center. Per the agreement, the JPA first
issued revenue bonds to generate money for the expansion.4 ' The
JPA then subleased the convention center to the City of San Diego in
exchange for rent payments equal to the debt service on the bonds.'
The plaintiffs contended that "through the legal equivalent of smoke
and mirrors, the City has arranged to do what the Constitution...
[does] not permit it to do: issue bonds without the approval of twothirds of the electorate., 45 The court expressly rejected this
substance-over-form argument, instead finding that due to the
contingent nature of the lease agreement and independent legal
status of the JPA, the financing arrangement satisfied the
constitutional requirements.46 In other words, the court found that
the state constitution and the city's charter allowed the city to
circumvent the two-thirds vote requirement by creating a JPA to
finance public works projects. 7
Following the Rider court's reasoning, the Attorney General's
substance-over-form argument should be rejected here as well. In the
JPA-financed refunding bond context, the JPA-and not the school
district-receives the excess proceeds. This means that the JPA-and
not the school district-incurs any new debt. And because JPAs are
exempt from the constitutional debt limitation, the two-thirds voter
approval requirement is not triggered.
Admittedly, such an
arrangement is a legal fiction that effectively circumvents the
constitutional debt limitation. However, this is nothing new. Lease
financing arrangements, such as the one upheld in Rider, are clearly
an end run around the constitutional debt limit, and yet they have
been accepted by California courts because they comply with all of
the formal legal requirements. Consequently, there seems to be little
reason why a JPA-financed refunding bond issuance that is structured

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

92 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. at 22.
Rider v. City of San Diego, 18 Cal. 4th 1035, 1040 (1998).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1042.
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to satisfy all of the formal JPA and school district refunding laws
should not be accepted by California courts as well.
Conclusion
The Attorney General's answer to Question 5 suffers from
several infirmities and generally fails to adequately vet the JPA
refunding bond model. The Attorney General makes logical leaps
without connecting the dots, relies on inapt comparisons, cites dicta as
precedent, and refuses to indulge in the same legal fiction expressly
endorsed by the California Supreme Court. Because there are no
statutes and no case law compelling the school board to sell refunding
bonds at market rate, such a decision is left up to the good faith and
business judgment of the school board members. And if form truly
does trump substance-and based on the court's decision in Rider,
there is very good reason to think so-the JPA refunding bond model
should pose no new-debt problems under the state constitution.
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